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Introduction 
What is going on when one person speaks for others, in their collective name or on 
their behalf? We see this in a variety of contexts, involving both formal and informal 
groups. The Trump administration has a press secretary whose responsibilities include 
making announcements, declarations, and other claims in the name of the 
administration. Large companies like Amazon have designated company spokespersons, 
who issue statements on behalf of the company to the press. In many schools, one 
parent from each class is appointed to raise questions, make proposals, make requests, 
and so on, on behalf of the larger parent body in meetings with the school 
management. Even in very informal collectives like a set of stranded travellers whose 
luggage has been lost, it is common for one person to take up the role of complaining 
to the airline or demanding compensation for all of them. 
 
There are a number of interesting questions that can be asked about these kinds of 
cases— questions that, until recently, have been largely neglected by philosophers.2 One 
important question is, when a spokesperson speaks in the name of a group, should the 
speech act be attributed to the spokesperson or to the group that they represent? If it is 
the latter, then this raises another question: given that standard speech act theory is 
deeply individualistic in focus, how exactly should these kinds of group speech acts be 
accounted for? 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Many of the central ideas in this paper have been developed as part of my ongoing joint research with 
Dina Townsend, including a separate paper (in preparation) in which we identify several further varieties of 
group silencing in the context of community consultation. I am also grateful to audiences in Cologne, 
Vienna, Boston and Trieste for discussions that have helped to improve the paper. My research is 
financially supported by the Austrian Research Council, FWF project ‘Inferentialism and Collective 
Intentionality’ (I 3068). 
2 Two notable exceptions are Hughes (1984) and Meijers (2007), both of whom analyse group speech acts 
generally. The more recent literature on group speech is dominated by discussions of the epistemology of 
group testimony (Tollefsen 2007, 2009, 2011; Fricker 2012; Lackey 2014; Faulkner 2018). Beyond this, 
Ludwig (2014) gives an account of spokesperson speech, while the specific speech act of group assertion is 
discussed by Tollefsen (forthcoming) and Lackey (2018, ms). 
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In recent work, Jennifer Lackey has developed an answer to both of these questions, at 
least for those cases in which a spokesperson asserts in the name of a group.3 In answer 
to the first question, she gives a compelling argument that these cases should be 
counted as genuine group assertions, in the sense it is the group itself, rather than the 
spokesperson, to whom the act of assertion should be attributed. In answer to the 
second, she offers an account of this form of group assertion, according to which 
groups assert just when a suitably authorized spokesperson, with the right set of 
intentions, speaks in virtue of their authority as the group’s spokesperson. In this paper, 
I accept the case Lackey makes for group assertion, but I attempt to pose a challenge for 
the account she gives of it. 
 
My argument, in short, is that there is a genuine phenomenon—the phenomenon of 
‘group silencing’4—that Lackey’s account of group assertion struggles to properly 
accommodate. This is by no means a knockdown argument, but I think it puts pressure 
on an account like Lackey’s, especially since there are a variety of alternative 
frameworks available that would have no similar trouble accommodating and explaining 
group silencing. To illustrate my argument, I present a real-world example taken from 
international environmental law. The example involves an ‘indigenous community’ 
being thwarted in their attempts to make assertions about their natural environment, 
because these attempts are not given the uptake they deserve. This poses a challenge for 
Lackey’s account, because she holds that speakers, whether individuals or groups, can 
successfully make assertions regardless of how their utterances are taken up by the 
audience. What reflection on group silencing shows us, I argue, is that an adequate of 
account of group assertion needs to find a place for audience uptake.5 
 
1. Lackey’s case for group assertion 
Only those with the capacity for speech can be silenced, so let us begin by considering 
whether groups can speak, and, in particular, whether they can assert. I take ‘assertion’ 
to refer to flat-out claiming that p, as opposed to various other speech acts such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lackey (2018, ms.) 
4 I use the term ‘silencing’ in a broad sense, encompassing all the species of what I later call ‘linguistic 
injustice’. 
5 Though my focus is specifically on group assertion and group silencing, I do think the more general 
conclusion also holds—that what reflection on the phenomenon of silencing shows us is that an adequate 
framework for speech acts needs to find a place for audience uptake. Silencing arguments have been made 
before with respect to individual speech acts, and so I see my primary contribution in this paper as 
illustrating that the same applies in the realm of group speech.  
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conjectures, guesses and suppositions that are sometimes classified in the broader 
category of ‘assertives’. Assertion understood in this way (as claiming that p) includes 
stating, telling, announcing, declaring, and reporting—all acts which it appears that 
groups are able to perform. The weather bureau reports on the flooding; Pussy Riot issues 
a statement on Twitter; the University management tells its employees when the main 
building will be closed for renovations; a scientific research team announces its key 
findings, and so on. In all these cases it appears that an assertion is performed and the 
speaker is the group. 
 
Lackey divides cases such as these into two broad categories: ‘co-ordinated group 
assertion’, which involves a number of people working together to produce a 
meaningful utterance, and ‘authority-based group assertion’, which involves a suitably 
authorized individual speaking for the group (Lackey 2018: 22-23). She devotes most of 
her attention to the authority-based variety, which she thinks is the primary form of 
group assertion and which, she suggests, has not been well understood. Paradigmatic 
examples of this form of group assertion include the pronouncements made by the 
official spokespersons who speak for formal organisations such as governmental 
agencies and private companies, but also smaller, informal groups in which an 
individual acquires the authority to speak for others simply by accommodation or non-
objection. 
 
One of the particular misconceptions about authority-based group assertion that Lackey 
wants to address is the idea that it is not really group assertion: that the group itself is not 
actually the speaker in these cases, since whatever assertion is ascribed to the group can 
always be reduced to the assertion of the spokesperson. Against this kind of reductivist 
(or ‘deflationary’) understanding, Lackey identifies several speaker-related features of 
assertion, and shows that when a spokesperson speaks in the name of a group, these 
features do not apply to the spokesperson but rather to the whole group. This means 
that, contra the reductivist (or deflationist), ‘spokespersons are not asserting anything in 
cases of authority based group assertion; they are simply the means by which groups 
offer assertions’ (Lackey 2018: 39). 
 
One of the speaker-related features that Lackey identifies is the norm of assertion. 
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Many philosophers accept that assertion is governed by some kind of epistemic norm, 
such as the rule that the speaker should only assert what she knows, or what she has 
warrant for.6 Such norms are commonly held to explain why speakers are criticisable 
when they assert things that they do not know, or at least possess warrant for. But if 
assertion is governed by this kind of speaker-related epistemic norm, then this allows us 
to ask, who exactly is bound by this norm in spokesperson cases, and who exactly is 
criticisable when the assertion in such cases manifestly flouts the norm? As Lackey 
suggests, it seems strange to think that the spokesperson herself must satisfy the 
relevant epistemic standard—that when she says that p in the name of the group, she 
herself must know that p or possess warrant for p. Rather, the main responsibility of 
the spokesperson is to say what they have been told to say, or at least what they take the 
view of the group to be. A spokesperson can therefore perform her duties impeccably 
without knowing, believing, or possessing warrant for, what she says in the name of a 
group. 
 
Closely related to the norm of assertion, it is sometimes claimed that assertion involves 
the speaker representing herself as knowing, or possessing warrant for, what she 
asserts.7 Here too we may ask: who exactly is being represented in these ways when a 
spokesperson speaks in the name of a group? It would be odd to think that the 
spokesperson herself purports to know or to possess warrant for what she asserts. 
Think of such cases as a spokesperson reporting the findings of a commission of 
inquiry, or a representative of a pharmaceutical company stating the health benefits of a 
new product. In these cases, it seems to be understood, both by the spokesperson and 
the audience, that it is the group itself (the commission of inquiry, or the 
pharmaceutical company), rather than the spokesperson, that is being depicted as 
possessing the relevant epistemic credentials. 
 
Similarly, a number of philosophers have suggested that by asserting the speaker gives 
the audience certain entitlements, such as the entitlement to ‘pass the epistemic buck’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Proponents of the knowledge norm include Williamson (2000), De Rose (2002) and Hawthorne (2004). 
Lackey (2007) herself defends an alternative norm that she calls the ‘reasonable to believe norm’. 
7  Goldberg (2015: 7) calls this the ‘conveyed self-representation implicit in assertion’ and suggests that it 
explains why ‘an appropriate reaction to an assertion is to query how the speakers knows or has proper 
evidence’. 
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back to the original speaker if she (the audience) is challenged.8 So, to whom are we 
entitled to defer challenges when we re-assert what a group asserts through its 
spokesperson? Again, it seems clear that we would not target the particular 
spokesperson but rather the group itself. This is evident from that fact we may still 
defer challenges to a group even after the original spokesperson—the one from whom 
some assertion was heard—has been replaced. This suggests that it is the group itself, 
not the spokesperson, that undertakes epistemic responsibility when a spokesperson 
asserts in its name. 
 
There is one final speaker-related feature of assertion that is not explicitly noted by 
Lackey but which I think can also help to establish the irreducibility of group assertion. 
This is the feature of retractability: when a speaker changes her mind or for some other 
reason comes to regret having asserted something, she is typically in a position to ‘take 
back’ her assertion by means of the speech act of retraction. 9  Crucially, this is 
something that no-one but the speaker can do. No matter how much I would like to, I 
cannot retract my sister’s assertions. In spokesperson cases, however, it is clear that a 
retraction can be made by someone other than the original spokesperson. Indeed, this is 
often what happens, since the original spokesperson may have been replaced precisely 
because of their role in the original assertion. As with the other speaker-related features 
of assertion noted by Lackey, what this suggests is that the original assertion should not 
be attributed to the spokesperson but rather to the whole group. 
 
2. Lackey’s account of group assertion 
So let us accept with Lackey that groups themselves assert when a spokesperson speaks 
in their name. How then should this sort of group assertion be accounted for? Lackey 
gives the following account of such ‘authority-based group assertion’ (ABGA): 
‘A group G asserts that p in the authority-based way if and only if that p belongs 
to a domain d, and a spokesperson(s) S (i) reasonably intends to convey the 
information that p in virtue of the communicable content of an individual act (or 
individual acts) of communication, (ii) has the authority to convey the 
information in d, and (iii) acts in this way in virtue of S’s authority as a 
representative of G’ (Lackey 2018: 30-31) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See e.g., Goldberg (2007), McMyler (2011) 
9 See e.g., MacFarlane (2011), and Goldberg (2015) 
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Let us break this down into its component parts, starting with (i), which is in fact 
Lackey’s account of the speech act of individual testimony.10 (Note that Lackey treats 
‘testimony’ and ‘assertion’ as interchangeable in this context; setting various qualms 
aside, I follow her in doing this here.) Lackey here goes in for a very minimal 
intentionalist account of the speech act of testimony / assertion—‘intentionalist’ in the 
sense that what makes some communicative act count as assertion are the intentions of 
the speaker. Specifically, the speaker must intend to convey the information that p in 
virtue of the communicable content of her act(s) of communication. 
 
One of the striking things about Lackey’s account of individual testimony / assertion is 
that, unlike classic intentionalist approaches, such as Gricean accounts (Grice 1989; 
Recanati 1987), the speaker need not intend to communicate with or indeed produce 
any effect on an audience. This becomes clear when we see how Lackey unpacks the 
notions of ‘acts of communication’ and ‘conveying information’. According to Lackey, 
an ‘act of communication […] does not require that the speaker intend to communicate 
to others; instead, it requires merely that the speaker intend to express communicable 
content’ (Lackey 2006: 187). This means that someone who writes in a private diary, or 
who gives a soliloquy, is still performing an ‘act of communication’ on her account, 
even though they are obviously not communicating, or even attempting to 
communicate. In a similar vein, it is no part of Lackey’s notion of ‘conveying 
information’ that information get conveyed or transmitted from one person to another, 
or that the speaker attempt to convey information to somebody else. Rather, for an act 
of communication to ‘convey information’ is, roughly speaking, for it to carry a certain 
meaning. For example, when someone utters a declarative sentence that expresses the 
proposition p, this act of communication ‘conveys the information that p’, regardless of 
whether there was anyone to whom the sentence was uttered. Lackey’s account of 
individual testimony / assertion is thus deeply individualistic: speakers can make 
assertions without any help from their audience, indeed without intending to have any 
effect on an audience at all. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Although Lackey insists that her primary interest is epistemological rather than speech act theoretic—
that she is not ‘specifically interested in characterizing the speech act of testifying, but, rather, in carving 
out the domain of testimony as a source of belief’ (2006: 178)—it is nonetheless reasonably clear that (i) 
provides her view of testimony as a speech act. This is suggested by the fact that she dubs it ‘speaker 
testimony’ and characterizes it as ‘testimony as an intentional activity on the part of the speaker’ (2006: 
187). 
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The next two conditions in ABGA, (ii) and (iii), are introduced to cover some of the 
complexities not present in cases of individual assertion, because they have to do with 
the role of the spokesperson. Both conditions presuppose a notion of ‘having authority’ 
to speak for the group, and it is important to note that the notion of authority Lackey 
invokes here is pluralist and non-normative. This means that there are many different 
ways in which someone can come to possess the authority to speak for a group, ranging 
from tradition, to accommodation, even to bullying and oppression. The main point 
Lackey insists on here is a negative one. She wants to deny that a spokesperson must be 
recognised by others in order to have the proper authority to speak for the group. 
According to her, a spokesperson can have the authority to speak for the group even if 
she is not recognised as having that authority by the audience to whom she speaks, nor 
even by the group’s own members.11 
 
Beyond the invocation of the notion of authority, condition (ii) helps to circumscribe 
the autonomy of the spokesperson. As Lackey points out, a spokesperson is not simply 
a mouthpiece’ of the group, one who simply reads off a pre-prepared script. Instead, a 
spokesperson is often called upon to make pronouncements in the name of the group 
on matters that the group has not previously explicitly decided upon. However, 
although the spokesperson must have some discretion, she also does not have complete 
carte blanche to represent and commit the group in any way she likes. What condition (ii) 
does, then, is specify the proper limits of the spokesperson’s autonomy, by saying that 
she has discretion to represent the group but only within a circumscribed domain. 
 
Condition (iii) suggests that for a group to assert via a spokesperson, the spokesperson 
must perform the act of communication in virtue of her authority as the 
spokesperson—or, to put it differently, she must be speaking in her capacity as 
spokesperson. This is included because spokespersons are also of course private 
individuals, i.e., people who sometimes speak in their own names rather than in the 
name of a group. Condition (iii) is needed so that we don’t end up counting the 
personal statements of spokespersons as group assertions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Lackey develops this point largely in response to Kirk Ludwig’s ‘status function’ model of spokesperson 
speech (Ludwig 2014), according to which spokespersons must be collectively accepted as such by both 
the audience and the group’s members in order to properly count as spokespersons. 
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It should be clear, looking at the whole account, that everything that it takes for a group 
to assert—in the ‘authority-based’ way at least—is located on the group’s side of the 
exchange. So long as the group authorizes a spokesperson in one way or another, and 
so long as the spokesperson performs an ‘act of communication’ with the right 
intentions and in virtue of her authority as spokesperson, the group will succeed in 
asserting. There is no need for an audience to recognise the spokesperson’s authority, 
and no need for an audience to recognise the meaning and force of the speech act the 
group intends to perform. There is, in fact, no need for an audience at all, not even in 
the content of the spokesperson’s intentions. In the remainder of this paper I want to 
argue that this speaker- centric, individualistic approach to group assertion obscures the 
phenomenon of group silencing. 
 
3. Alternative approaches: speech as social action 
Before I discuss a particular case of group silencing, I want to point out that Lackey’s 
individualistic approach to assertion is by no means the only approach available. On the 
contrary, there are a number of alternative approaches that view assertion—and speech 
acts in general—as distinctively social in character. I will briefly mention three such 
approaches here: the conventionalist approach associated with Austin, the intentionalist 
approach associated with Grice, and the normative functionalist approach associated 
with Kukla and Lance. Though they are very different from one another, all of these 
approaches stand in sharp contrast to Lackey’s account of assertion since they all make 
the success of assertion depend, in one way or another, on audience uptake. 
 
Let us begin with Austin. Austin (1962) distinguished between three basic sorts of act 
that a speaker performs on any particular occasion when she speaks. The first is the 
locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to the speaker’s performance of a meaningful 
utterance, such as ‘A bunch of us are meeting for drinks later’. The second is the 
illocutionary act, which is the act that the speaker performs in uttering those words. For 
example, she might be inviting her audience to join for drinks, or she might be refusing an 
invitation to go bowling, or she might simply be telling someone of her plans. These 
acts—telling, refusing, inviting—are all illocutionary acts. Finally, the third sort of thing 
people do with words are perlocutionary acts, things that they achieve by means of what they 
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say. For instance, someone who performs the illocution of inviting might thereby 
persuade her audience to come for drinks, or, if she is simply telling her audience of her 
plans, she might thereby get the audience to believe her. Persuading somebody to do 
something, or getting them to believe something, just like amusing, seducing, shocking, 
and so on, are all perlocutionary acts. 
 
Austin’s main focus was on illocutionary acts, which he thought were only fully 
successfully performed when they are received in the right way by the audience: 
‘Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, 
successfully performed […]. I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it 
hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense […]. So the performance 
of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake. (Austin 1962: 116-17). 
 
Note that the sort of ‘effect’ or ‘uptake’ at issue here is not related to the fulfilment of 
any of the speaker’s perlocutionary aims, such as getting one’s audience to heed one’s 
warning or believe what one has told them.12 Rather, the uptake Austin is alluding to is 
simply the correct recognition by the audience of the speech act the speaker is attempting 
to perform. What uptake requires is that the audience both understand what the speaker 
means— attach the right content to the speaker’s words—and correctly recognise what 
sort of illocutionary act she means to perform.13 So if I try to tell you that there are 
toadstools in the forest, but you think I have told you there are toad’s tools in the forest, 
then there is a lack of uptake because you didn’t get my meaning. And if I try to tell you 
about the toadstools but you think I am making some kind of weird joke, then there is 
lack of uptake because you didn’t recognise that my words were intended to have the 
force of telling, rather than joking. In both cases, because there is no uptake, my act of 
telling is not “happily, successfully performed”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Lackey (2018: 24-25 footnote 4) herself seems to mistakenly attribute this perlocutionary sense of 
‘uptake’ to Austin. This is clear when she claims that an Austinian approach to testimony would have the 
absurd consequence that ‘one does not testify […] in a courtroom when one is not believed’ and that the 
‘known liar [i.e., someone who is recognised by the audience as lying] cannot lie’ because ‘there is no 
uptake’. In fact neither of these consequences follow from the Austinian notion of uptake, since Austinian 
uptake simply means recognizing what the speaker is up to, rather than believing them in what they say. 
13 Some Austinian theorists (such as Hornsby and Langton) seem to focus almost exclusively on the 
second aspect here, i.e., the correct recognition by the audience of the sort of speech act the speaker is 
performing (e.g., warning, as opposed to joking). Nevertheless, as Andrew Peet has recently argued, 
correctly interpreting the content of the speaker’s utterance is just as integral to Austinian uptake, since ‘if 
one misinterprets the content of an utterance then one fails to recognise the illocutionary act being 
performed’ (Peet 2017: 3425). 
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A very different sort of approach to speech acts appeals to Grice’s notion of ‘speaker 
meaning’ (Grice 1989). According to Grice, for a speaker to mean something by her 
words, the speaker must not only intend to get her audience to respond in some way, 
she must also intend that the audience recognise that this effect is what she (the 
speaker) intends, and that the audience treat this as a reason to respond as intended. This 
bundle of speaker intentions is what makes for communicative speech, including, 
centrally, the speech act of assertion. So, for example, a Gricean approach to the speech 
act of assertion would run roughly as follows: 
 
S asserts that p to A by uttering x, if and only if 
• S intends that A forms the belief that p; 
• S intends that A recognises that S intends that A form the belief that p; 
• S intends that A forms the belief that p because of recognizing that S intends 
that A form the belief that p (adapted from Pagin 2007) 
 
In contrast to the Austinian approach, here an assertion can be performed without 
audience uptake, since all that is needed is that the speaker perform an utterance with 
certain intentions—intentions that need not be fulfilled. However, it must be noted that 
the Gricean account still makes audience uptake a constitutive goal of speech, in the sense 
that the speaker necessarily aims at having her primary intention (the intention to 
inform, to warn, to invite, etc) recognised by the audience. What this suggests is that 
speech acts that are not given appropriate uptake, because the audience does not 
recognise the speaker’s primary intention, will be infelicitous or not fully successful, even 
though they count as having been performed. More precisely, a speaker whose speech 
act is not recognized as it is intended has failed at the communicative level. 
 
A third approach to speech acts that strongly emphasizes their social character has been 
developed by Kukla and Lance (Kukla & Lance 2009). Kukla and Lance individuate and 
characterize speech acts on the basis of their normative functional profiles—that is, the 
combination of their normative ‘inputs’ (the social conditions under which speakers are 
entitled to perform them) and their normative ‘outputs’ (the social conditions and 
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normative changes they produce) (Kukla & Lance 2009: 15). So, for example, the 
speech act of naming or christening an object may only be made in certain settings by a 
suitably positioned speaker, but, once made, it entitles all others in the speech 
community to refer to the named object by that name. By contrast, the speech act of 
asserting that p can be made by anyone who knows that p is true, and, once made, it 
licenses others to challenge the assertion, or to re-assert it themselves. These different 
normative functional profiles characterize what Kukla and Lance call the ‘performative 
force’ of the speech acts. 
 
As Kukla has emphasized, the normative functionalist approach to speech acts ‘means 
that a speech act requires uptake in order to have any performative force at all […] And 
what uptake it receives is partly constitutive of what speech act it turns out to be’ (Kukla 
2014: 443). On this picture, the speaker is not a god-like authority on what speech act 
she performs, if any. On the contrary, she may, in certain circumstances, attempt to 
make a speech act of one kind, only to find (when she observes the uptake her act actually 
receives) that she has performed a different kind of act altogether. Speech is thus 
conceived as a profoundly social affair, with both speaker and audience playing a crucial 
part in constituting an act of speech as a speech act of one kind or another. 
 
These three approaches all portray speech as social action, in the sense that the 
illocutionary, communicative, or performative success of speech acts is determined, at 
least in part, by the uptake those acts receive. Though I shall not develop or defend 
these approaches at any length here, I would like to point out that one important feature 
of them is that they allow us to recognise various forms of distinctively linguistic 
injustice—ways in which people can be wronged or harmed in their capacity as 
speakers. Before I move on to examine how groups might be the victims of such 
injustice, let me briefly rehearse how these approaches have been put to use in 
highlighting such injustice. 
 
Perhaps the best known example of this is the work of Jennifer Hornsby and Rae 
Langton on illocutionary ‘silencing’ in the context of sexual refusal.14 Hornsby and 
Langton use the Austinian framework for illocution to argue that certain social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Langton (1993), Hornsby (1994), Hornsby & Langton (1998) 
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conditions can make the speech act of refusal ‘unspeakable’ for women, by 
systematically interfering with the audience’s ability to recognise what the speaker is 
attempting to do. It is not simply that a woman’s refusal goes unheeded by her 
audience—that would fall into the category of the perlocutionary, on Austin’s 
framework—but rather that it goes unheard: the woman is not even taken to be refusing. 
Since uptake is necessary for illocutionary success on the Austinian framework, this 
means that certain women are ‘silenced’ when it comes to sexual refusal: they are literally 
prevented from performing the illocutionary acts they mean to perform. 
 
In a slightly different way, Ishani Maitra (2009) has used the Gricean intentionalist 
framework to highlight what she calls ‘communicative disablement’. Recall that on the 
Gricean framework the speaker not only intends to produce a response in her audience 
(get him, e.g., to believe her testimony or heed her warning) but also intends that the 
audience recognize that producing this response is what she (the speaker) intends. 
Maitra labels this latter intention the speaker’s ‘communicative intention’, and claims 
that when this goes unfulfilled—when the audience fails to recognize what response the 
speaker is intending to produce—the speaker is thereby prevented from 
communicating. This could happen because the audience systematically misconstrues 
the content or force of the speaker’s primary intention. Under the influence of a 
prejudicial stereotype about women, he might think, for example, that when she says 
‘No’ she is simply playing coy, or  inviting him to engage in role-play, rather than 
attempting to get him to stop his advances. When this happens, according to Maitra, the 
speaker is silenced—not in the sense that she is prevented from performing the act of 
refusal, but in the sense that she is prevented from communicating by her refusal. 
 
Also somewhat similarly, Rebecca Kukla (2014) has employed her own normative 
functionalist approach to speech acts to shed light on what she calls ‘discursive 
injustice’. According to Kukla, a discursive injustice occurs when the performative force 
that should attach to a speaker’s words is not simply cancelled by a lack of appropriate 
uptake (as it is in cases of silencing), but is instead distorted because of the social uptake 
it does receive, in ways that track and entrench social disadvantage. For example, there 
are cases in which women’s reports of sexual harassment are given uptake as claims of an 
altogether different sort—namely, claims about their subjective experience. In this way, 
women’s would-be assertions are turned into mere ‘expressives’: 
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[a woman] is attempting to put forth a claim about an objective event in the 
external world, which seeks uptake in the form of agreement or rational challenge 
from others. But often […] these sorts of speech acts […] are taken as expressives 
rather than claims about the world […] “My boss is inappropriately flirtatious with 
me” is received as some kind of expression of a feeling of discomfort’ (Kukla 2014: 
452) 
 
Seeing speech as social action thus allow us to identify distinctively linguistic 
injustices— ways in which speakers are wronged in their capacity as speakers. This can 
happen, for example, when they are prevented from performing certain illocutionary 
acts (Hornsby and Langton), when they are blocked from communicating (Maitra), or 
when they have the force of their words unfairly distorted (Kukla). And it is not just 
individual speakers who can be subjected to these kinds of injustices; groups can be too, 
as I will now try to illustrate. 
 
4. Group silencing in community consultation: the Sarayaku case 
My example comes from the domain of legally-required consultation with communities 
affected by activities such as mining and oil drilling.15 In a number of regional and 
domestic legal jurisdictions, courts and legislators have recognized an obligation on the 
state to consult with what are known as ‘indigenous communities’ when making 
decisions or taking actions that will affect the community’s land and/or environment. 
For instance, when a mining company applies for a mining license any local 
communities that may be affected by the proposed activities have a right be consulted 
about how these activities may affect the environment and whether and how the 
activities should be allowed to proceed. A central purpose of consultation, then, is to 
give these affected groups a ‘say’. 
 
One reason why legally-required community consultation is a particularly salient context 
in which to explore group assertion and group silencing is because the right to 
consultation has been recognized as one that belongs to the community itself, rather 
than only to the individual members of the community. So it is the community itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In a separate paper (in preparation), Dina Townsend and I examine several other cases of group 
silencing that arise in this context. 
GA&GS	   Prepublication	  version	   Leo	  Townsend	  	  
	   14	  
that is called upon to voice concerns, to make demands, to refuse or give its consent, 
and (most importantly for the purposes of this paper) to make assertions, with respect 
to the proposed activities. 
 
However, although the consultation process is meant to give indigenous groups a say, 
there are cases in which what these groups say is not given appropriate uptake. 
Specifically, in the cases I have in mind, these groups are prevented from successfully 
making assertions about the state of their environments. When they attempt to make 
such claims they are often heard as making claims of an altogether different sort—
claims about their own cultural world view or ‘belief system’. And this is something that 
has inadvertently been perpetuated by the very courts that have sought to empower 
these communities’ speech by promoting and defending the right to community 
consultation. 
 
To see this, consider the case of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku vs the State of Ecuador, a 
dispute that went to the Inter American Court of Human Rights.16 The dispute was 
about the State of Ecuador awarding a permit to a private oil company to begin oil 
exploration activities on traditional Kichwa territory. The Kichwa people staunchly 
opposed the oil exploration activities and claimed that a number of their rights had 
been violated in the lead up to the awarding of the permit, including the right to be 
properly consulted. In its judgment, the court found in favour of the Kichwa people, in 
part because the methods of consultation that had been used—methods that included 
bribes, bullying and ad hoc surveys—did not properly respect the traditional decision-
making structure of the community or its established ways of speaking for itself. 
 
In environmental legal circles this judgment is often lauded as a victory for the right to 
consultation, since it ensures that indigenous groups must be consulted on their own 
terms. And indeed it is an important step towards meaningful consultation. But it does 
not take us all the way there, for although groups may be given a platform to speak this 
will not count for much if their speech is silenced, disabled or distorted for not being 
heard as it is intended. And what is especially striking about the judgment in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (2012) Series C No 245 (Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights). 
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Sarayaku case is that the court itself seems to systematically misconstrue the testimony 
of the community with respect to its claims about the environment, thus stifling the 
community’s speech. 
 
This is evident from the way the court treats the assertions made by several leaders of 
the Kichwa people about the state and nature of the community’s natural environment 
and the place of the community within it, as recorded in the court’s judgment. In a 
public hearing conducted by the Court, the yachak of the Kichwa people,17 Sabino 
Gualinga, stated that, ‘Sarayaku is a living land, a living jungle; there are trees, medicinal 
plants and other types of beings there.’ In previous testimony he also made a point of 
describing different ‘pachas’ of the world, including one at a subterranean level: 
‘Beneath the ground, ucupacha, there are people living as they do here. There are 
beautiful towns down there, and there are trees, lakes and mountains.’ (Sarayaku v 
Ecuador: para. 150). In separate testimony, the president of the Sarayaku, Jose 
Gualinga, emphasized the importance of the forest to the community, claiming that 
‘[the forest] gives us the power, potential and energy that is vital to our survival and life. 
And everything is interconnected with the lagoons, the mountains, the trees, the beings 
and also us as an exterior living being.’ (ibid., para. 152). 
 
These claims are made by authorised spokespersons for the Kichwa people, who are 
being called upon by the Court to speak in the name of their community. And their 
claims are made in the context of explaining the Kichwa people’s opposition to oil 
exploration activities that would involve drilling under the ground and destroying parts 
of the forest. Given this context, and the fact that these claims have all the surface 
structure of typical assertions, it seems natural to interpret them as the Kichwa people’s 
assertions about the state and nature of the environment—about what is under the 
ground, about the richness of the forest, and about how the different elements of the 
environment are profoundly interdependent. Yet, strikingly, the court does not appear 
to interpret these assertions in this way, seeing them instead as the Kichwa’s claims 
about their own culture, belief-system or worldview. This is especially clear in the way 
that it sums up the section of its judgment in which these claims are featured. Without 
evaluating the truth of those claims—without accepting or denying that there are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A yachak (literally ‘one who knows’) is a spiritual leader or shaman. 
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mountains and lakes under the ground, that everything in the forest is interconnected, 
etc.—it simply concludes that: 
‘the Kichwa people have a profound and special relationship with their ancestral 
territory, which […] encompasses their own worldview and cultural and spiritual 
identity’ (ibid., para. 155) 
 
Note that this way of receiving the claims of the Kichwa stands in sharp contrast to the 
way the court treats the statements of other parties called upon to give evidence, such 
as expert witnesses. For instance, the anthropologist Rodrigo Villagra Carrón stated at 
the public hearing that ‘the cultural identity of each cultural group is dependent on the 
special relationship it has with nature, expressed in the most varied practices of 
management, protection, use or primary extraction of natural resources, goods or 
services from the ecosystems’ (ibid., para 154) In the court’s judgment, this is not 
treated as a claim about Villagra Carrón’s beliefs about what the cultural identity of 
cultural groups depends on, but simply as a claim about what the cultural identity of 
cultural groups depends on. Similarly, when an environmental engineering expert, 
William Powers, described in his expert report the likely impacts of a large oil project in 
the jungle, including the clearing of vegetation, impacts on water courses, soil erosion, 
etc, these claims were not taken by the court as expressive of William Powers’ 
‘worldview’, but simply as straightforward assertions about the likely impacts of the 
proposed activities on the environment in question. 18 However, when the Kichwa 
attempt to make similarly straightforward assertions about their environment, they are 
heard as making claims about their belief-system or worldview.19   
 
It seems that something has gone wrong here—or, to put it more boldly, that the 
Kichwa people have been wronged here, that they have been the victims of some kind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid, para 174 (footnote 230). 
19 I consider the declarative form of the community’s claims, together with salient aspects of the discursive 
context, to be good evidence that these claims are meant as straightforward assertions. But of course it is 
still defeasible evidence, and it should be acknowledged that the community may mean for their claims to 
be understood as (primarily) expressions of their belief-system rather than as straightforward assertions. In 
other words, the community could be engaging in ‘mythical discourse’ rather than fact-stating discourse, 
and indeed it may be that there is no clear distinction between these forms of discourse within their 
linguistic practice (cf. Tsosie 2017). In this connection it would be helpful to know more about what the 
community takes itself to be doing when it makes these claims, as well its reactions to the way its speech is 
received by the Court. Did the community feel it had not been properly heard? This is an empirical 
question, and one whose answer is not contained in the Court’s judgment. I thank Marina Sbisa and a 
reviewer for suggesting that I acknowledge this possibility.  
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of linguistic injustice. This is because the court fails to give their would-be assertions the 
uptake that they should, by rights, receive. The Kichwa community attempt to make 
straightforward assertions about the state of the environment, using the right words in 
the mouths of the right people, but they are heard as making claims of an altogether 
different sort—claims about their cultural and spiritual identity or ‘worldview’.20 And 
this is not an isolated incident: the claims made by indigenous groups about 
environmental impacts are routinely interpreted by courts as claims about impacts on 
their culture or belief systems.21 
 
Before I move on to consider how this sort of case might be accounted for, I want to 
forestall one particular concern about declaring it an ‘injustice’. The concern is that the 
court’s interpretation of the community’s assertions cannot be an injustice since it is 
made in the spirit of charity—that, far from wronging the Kichwa people, interpreting 
their words in this way is doing them some kind of favour. This is because, were those 
claims to be construed as claims about the natural environment, they would not be 
worth taking seriously. There simply are no beautiful towns, or trees, lakes and 
mountains under the ground, and so a principle of charity requires that the court hear 
this as a claim about culture or belief, rather than about the environment itself. 
 
For what it is worth, I doubt that the court is engaging in this kind of interpretative 
practice in this case, or in others like it. But, even so, the line of thinking that would 
vindicate such interpretative practices is troublingly paternalistic and patronizing, and 
should be resisted. It is no act of charity to twist someone’s words so that their claims 
become, by one’s own lights, more epistemically plausible. Not only does this fail to 
respect their epistemic agency, by implicitly deeming them unworthy of rational 
criticism and debate, it also undermines the very thing that consultation is meant to 
empower—their linguistic agency. Putting words in someone else’s mouth is not ‘giving 
them a say’, and so even if this were what the court was doing in this sort of case, their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Perhaps the Court does hear the community’s claims as assertions about the environment but simply 
dismisses them as false, while still treating them as evidence of the community’s ‘worldview’. While I 
acknowledge that this could be what is going on, I do not think it is the most plausible interpretation, for 
two reasons. First, as mentioned, the court does not accept or reject the assertions of the community about 
the environment. Second, the way it frames its conclusion that ‘the Kichwa people have a profound and 
special relationship with their ancestral territory, which […] encompasses their own worldview and cultural 
and spiritual identity’ seems very much in the spirit of uptake, as a kind of gloss or restatement of what (they 
think) the Kichwa themselves are saying. Thanks to a reviewer for encouraging me to address this point.  
21 See, e.g., Tsosie (2017: 361-362) for two further examples. 
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doing so would nonetheless qualify as perpetrating an injustice. 
 
If we accept, then, that there is an injustice in this case, we may wonder how best to 
account for it. Views of speech as social action provide excellent resources for this task. 
One could, with Hornsby and Langton, diagnose the problem as one of illocutionary 
disablement. On this reading, we might say that assertions about certain things, such as 
the objective state of the natural environment, are rendered ‘unspeakable’ for groups 
like the Kichwa people. This may be because of a deep-seated stereotype that impugns 
the epistemic authority of these groups vis-à-vis that topic. The result is that they are 
never heard to be making such assertions, and so—given that uptake is necessary for 
illocution— they are illocutionarily ‘silenced’. 
 
Another, alternative diagnosis of the injustice would follow Maitra in viewing this as a 
case of communicative disablement. On this reading we would allow that the Kichwa 
perform their assertion about the environment, but insist that they are silenced in the 
communicative sense. That is, by failing to recognise the community’s primary 
intention, to inform the court about the environment, the court subjects the Kichwa 
people to a form of communicative disablement. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most plausibly, one could view this case through the lens of 
Kukla’s ‘discursive injustice’, where the uptake a speech act receives distorts its 
performative force, making it count as something quite different from what the speaker 
set out to do. Kukla’s example quoted earlier, in which women’s claims about (the 
objective reality of) sexual harassment are only given uptake as claims about their 
subjective experience, seems particularly apt in this context. In that example, because of 
how their claims are received, women find that their would-be assertions are rendered 
relatively innocuous by being transformed into mere expressives; in this way their 
speech is disempowered. Similarly, it seems that the Kichwa people’s claims about the 
natural environment are somehow diminished when they are only heard as claims about 
their cultural or spiritual identity or ‘worldview’. Just as in Kukla’s example, this 
collective discursive injustice also tracks and entrenches a certain kind of social 
disadvantage—here a kind of social epistemic disadvantage. This is because the root of 
the injustice is the Kichwa’s perceived lack of epistemic authority to make assertions 
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about the objective state of the environment (only ‘independent’ scientific experts are 
accorded this authority), while the effect of the injustice is to ensure that the group is 
subject to a kind of epistemic marginalization. Since they are only heard as making 
claims about their own culture or belief system, the Kichwa are effectively excluded 
from the process of determining how their environment will be affected by the 
proposed activities. 
 
5. Back to Lackey’s account 
The three approaches canvassed above, each of which conceives of speech as social 
action, thus offer rich resources for highlighting the intuitive injustice that takes place in 
the Sarayaku case. More specifically, each of these approaches allows us to see the 
injustice in distinctively linguistic terms: they allow us to say that the Kichwa people are 
wronged here in their capacity as a (group) speaker; that the uptake their attempted 
assertions receive serves to disempower their speech. By contrast, Lackey’s deeply 
individualistic approach has no comparable way of accommodating and explaining the 
injustice. On her account, the only way to silence or disempower a speaker would be by 
stopping her from uttering words, or perhaps by controlling her intentions. Since neither 
of these things are happening in the Kichwa case she cannot diagnose the injustice in 
terms of silencing or linguistic disempowerment. 
 
To see this in more detail, note first that, given certain plausible assumptions, all of 
Lackey’s conditions for authority-based group assertion are met when the 
representatives of the Kichwa people give their testimony to the court. The first 
condition in her account requires that, for a group to assert that p, a spokesperson must 
‘reasonably intend to convey the information that p in virtue of the communicable 
content of an individual act (or individual acts) of communication’. It seems clear that 
both the yachak—who describes the richness of the forest and the pacha under the 
ground—and the president, who stresses the profound interconnectedness of the forest 
environment, not only have such intentions, but that these intentions are reasonable, in 
the sense that their utterances are indeed apt vehicles for conveying the information 
they seek to convey. Moreover, in terms of their traditional political structure, both the 
yachak and the president are authorized to speak on behalf of the Kichwa community 
about matters that affect the communal life and livelihood of the whole community, 
such as the proposed oil exploration activities. And there is no reason to doubt that, 
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when they make their assertions to the court, they are speaking in virtue of that 
authority, that is, in their capacities as spokespersons for the community. This means 
that the second and third condition of Lackey’s analysis are also met, and hence that, on 
Lackey’s account, the Kichwa people succeed in making assertions via these 
spokespersons. 
 
It is worth noting further that, not only are Lackey’s conditions for group assertion met 
in this case, but the speaker’s intentions are actually fulfilled. Unlike Gricean accounts of 
assertion, in which speakers’ intentions make essential reference to audience uptake, 
Lackey’s account only requires that the speaker reasonably intend to convey 
information via her act of communication. But, as we saw earlier, ‘conveying 
information’ can be done simply by uttering a declarative sentence that expresses a 
proposition, while an ‘act of communication’ need not involve somebody 
communicating, or even trying to communicate, with another person. This means that 
the complete lack of uptake on the part of the court in the Sarayaku case is no obstacle 
to the speaker’s intentions being fulfilled. On the contrary, since these spokespersons 
did manage to perform ‘acts of communication’ that expressed certain propositions, 
their intentions were fulfilled and they succeeded in ‘conveying the information’ they 
sought to convey (even though this information was not conveyed to anyone). In short, 
not only were these group assertions successfully brought off, the speaker’s intentions in 
performing them were wholly fulfilled: these were, to use an Austinian term, entirely 
felicitous assertions. This suggests that, however else she might wish to accommodate this 
sort of example, Lackey cannot claim that the Kichwa people have been wronged in 
their capacity as speakers—that they been silenced or been made the victims of some 
other kind of linguistic injustice. 
 
How then might Lackey try to accommodate this kind of example? As I see it, there are, 
broadly speaking, two possible ways of responding. The first involves denying that there 
is really an injustice in the case: something goes wrong in the communicative exchange, 
of course, but it is not a case of anyone being wronged. The second response involves 
accepting that there is an injustice but suggesting that it is an epistemic, rather than a 
linguistic, injustice—that it is not a matter of the Kichwa people’s assertions going 
unheard, but rather a matter of their assertions being dismissed. To end off let me 
briefly consider these two possible responses in turn. 
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I have already considered and rejected one form of denial that the Kichwa people suffer 
an injustice in this case—namely, the claim that the court is actually doing them a 
service by generously construing their assertions about the environment as claims about 
their cultural belief system. Another, less preposterous, way of denying the injustice 
would be to say that this is just an innocent misunderstanding, of the sort to which all 
communication is vulnerable. The court simply did not ‘get’ what the community was 
trying to say; that is unfortunate, but it happens. We cannot count all such 
miscommunication as injustice on pain of proliferating linguistic injustices beyond 
credibility. 
 
In response to this, it should immediately be acknowledged that, indeed, not every 
misunderstanding or miscommunication amounts to a linguistic injustice. Audiences do 
not silence speakers simply when the traffic is too noisy for them to hear properly, for 
instance. But by the same token, not all misunderstandings are innocent, as 
philosophers who deploy notions such as silencing have been keen to stress. Some 
‘misunderstandings’ are pernicious and systematic, they are rooted in prevalent social 
conditions or widely held prejudicial stereotypes concerning the social identity of the 
speaker, and they serve to further undermine or disempower the speaker in various ways. 
It is these misunderstandings that fall under the banner of silencing or linguistic injustice. 
And, given that the misunderstanding at issue in the Sarayaku case seems to fit this 
profile—it is (arguably) rooted in a prejudice, it serves to further marginalize the group, 
and it is not an isolated instance but rather a ‘practice’ of misconstrual—it cannot be so 
easily shrugged off as an innocent misunderstanding. 
 
The second way that Lackey might wish to accommodate the Sarayaku case is by 
insisting that the injustice is epistemic, rather than linguistic, in character. In other 
words, the Kichwa people are not being wronged in their capacity as speakers, but 
rather in their capacity as knowers. More specifically, they are victims of what Fricker 
(2007) calls ‘testimonial injustice’: because they are accorded too little credibility or 
epistemic authority with respect to the state of the natural environment, their assertions 
about that topic are being unfairly dismissed or not taken sufficiently seriously. So it is 
not that they fail to assert (how could they, given that asserting is up to them alone?) 
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but that their assertions are routinely and unfairly prevented from achieving their 
perlocutionary aims, of getting the court to believe them. 
 
In response to this reading, it should be acknowledged that the cause of the injustice 
suffered by the Kichwa people may well be a prejudicial stereotype about their 
epistemic authority in some domain. (Indeed, this is more or less what I have been 
suggesting all along.) But, crucially, this does not make the injustice they suffer an 
epistemic injustice. A standard case of epistemic injustice is one in which the speaker is 
heard to be asserting or testifying that p, but, because they are unfairly assigned low 
credibility by the audience, their assertion or testimony is not believed, though it 
deserves to be.22 In contrast, a linguistic injustice is more basic that this, since it 
concerns something upon which testimonial injustice depends, namely the recognition 
by the audience of what the speaker is up to (asserting or testifying). And it is at this 
more basic point that the injustice seems to arise in the Kichwa case. It is not that their 
claims about the natural environment are rejected or deemed to be unworthy of belief by 
the court, but rather that the court does not even hear them as making claims for which 
a question of belief-worthiness might arise.23 
 
Conclusion 
It thus seems to me that, in contrast to those views that see speech as social action, 
Lackey’s account of group assertion cannot adequately explain the intuitive injustice we 
see in the Kichwa case. This is because Lackey’s account has no place for audience 
recognition or uptake: so long as a group puts the right words in right mouths, it will 
fully succeed in asserting. But the intuition I have attempted to elicit, that the Kichwa 
community suffer a distinctively linguistic injustice, puts pressure on this account. 
Specifically, if we want to be able to say that the Kichwa community is wronged in its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Note that Fricker does discuss also a form of extreme testimonial injustice that could be 
counted as ‘silencing’, in the sense that the speaker’s testimony is not so much dismissed as not even heard 
as testimony. She writes: ‘there might be social climates in which women lack credibility so drastically for 
certain subject matters that their word fails altogether to register in male hearer’ testimonial sensibility’ 
(Fricker 2007: 141). 
23 As acknowledged earlier (footnote 20 above), it is possible that the Court does hear the Kichwa’s claims 
as they are meant—as assertions about the environment—and simply dismisses them, and hence that this 
case may be best viewed through the lens of epistemic injustice rather than silencing. While I think that the 
silencing interpretation is actually the correct one in this case, it should be noted that this need not be 
established in order for the case to pose a challenge to Lackey’s account. On the contrary, the mere 
possibility that this case could be a case of silencing is enough to challenge Lackey’s account, since, on her 
account, no such phenomenon is even possible.  
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capacity as a speaker, then it seems that Lackey’s deeply individualistic, speaker-centric 
approach to the speech act of group assertion stands in need of revision. 
 	    
GA&GS	   Prepublication	  version	   Leo	  Townsend	  	  




Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
DeRose, K. (2002). ‘Assertion, knowledge, and context’. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167- 
203. 
 
Faulkner, P. (2018). ‘Collective Testimony and Collective Knowledge’. Ergo: An Open 
Access Journal of Philosophy 5. 
 
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
---. (2012). ‘Group Testimony? The Making of a Collective Good Informant.’ Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):249-276. 
 
Goldberg, S. (2007). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
---. (2015). Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Grice, H.P (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
  
Hawthorne, J. (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hornsby, J. (1994). ‘Illocution and its significance’, in Tsohatzidis. S. (ed), Foundations of 
Speech Act Theory. London: Routledge. 
 
Hughes, J. (1984).’ Group speech acts.’ Linguistics and Philosophy 7 (4):379 - 395. 
 
GA&GS	   Prepublication	  version	   Leo	  Townsend	  	  
	   25	  
Kukla, R. (2014). ‘Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice.’ Hypatia 29 
(2):440-457. 
 
Kukla, R. & Lance, M. (2009). ‘“Yo!” and “Lo!”’. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Lackey, J. (2006). ‘The nature of testimony.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):177–197. 
---. (2007). ‘Norms of assertion.’ Noûs 41 (4):594–626. 
---. (2014), ‘A deflationary account of group testimony’, in Lackey, J. (ed), Essays in 
collective epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
---. (2018). ‘Group Assertion.’ Erkenntnis 83 (1):21-42. 
---. (ms) ‘Group lies’. 
 
Langton, R. (1993). ‘Speech acts and unspeakable acts.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 
(4):293-330. 
 
Langton, R. & Hornsby, J. (1998). ‘Free speech and illocution.’ Legal Theory 4 (1):21-37.  
 
Ludwig, K. (2014). ‘Proxy Agency in Collective Action.’ Noûs 48 (1):75-105. 
 
MacFarlane, J. (2011). ‘What Is Assertion?’ in Brown, J. & Cappelen, H. (eds.), Assertion: 
New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Maitra, I. (2009). ‘Silencing speech.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 309-338. 
 
McMyler, B. (2011). Testimony, Trust, and Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Meijers A. (2007) ‘Collective Speech Acts’. in: Tsohatzidis S.L. (ed) Intentional Acts and 
Institutional Facts. Theory and Decision Library, 41. Springer, Dordrecht. 
 
Pagin, P. (2015). ‘Assertion.’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
GA&GS	   Prepublication	  version	   Leo	  Townsend	  	  
	   26	  
 
Peet, A. (2017). ‘Epistemic injustice in utterance interpretation.’ Synthese 194 (9):3421-
3443. 
 
Recanati, F. (1986). ‘On Defining Communicative Intentions.’ Mind and Language 1 
(3):213- 41. 
 
Tollefsen, D. (2007). ‘Group testimony.’ Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311. 
---. (2009). ‘WIKIPEDIA and the Epistemology of Testimony.’ Episteme 6 (1):8-24. 
---. (2011). ‘Groups as Rational Sources.’ in Schmid, H.B., Sirtes,D. & Weber, M. (eds.), 
Collective Epistemology. Ontos. pp. 20--11. 
--(forthcoming), ‘Can groups assert that p?’ in Goldberg, S. (ed)The Oxford Handbook on 
Assertion. 
 
Townsend, D. (forthcoming). ‘Informed consultation, environmental impacts and 
indigenous descriptions of the world.’ Journal of Human Rights and the Environment. 
 
Tsosie, R. (2017). ‘Indigenous peoples, anthropology, and the legacy of epistemic 
injustice,’ in Kidd I., Medina, J. & Pohlhaus, G. (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic 
Injustice. London: Routledge. 
 
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
